# Synthetic decision-record reviewer case

This offline fixture was constructed on September 30, 2026 with a new ephemeral test key. No running proxy, model or tool was used. The signing key was not persisted. Timestamps are self-reported, not independently attested.

Review question: can the exported decisions be checked against a separately retained expected key?

Inspect policy.json, requests.json and expected-decisions.json. The policy reference is SHA-256 of the sorted-key canonical policy: af508edbe7a479f752d6f4f29cfb7900e58250cce4fc58909e1010d47d3846f4. Both signed receipts cite it. The policy predicate here is only exact named-tool allow/disallow; no path, rate, filesystem or model evaluation occurs. The control-results file records implementation outcomes; rerun them yourself.

Use a maintained Node.js release. These commands use only the included verifier and public files.

```text
node verify.mjs evidence-bundle.json --pubkey ab1c6c3dbc49c942d424f6b39ca6e658fe5d439e255e6efdd0427ef3fab4fbf5
# Expected: VERIFIED, provenance verified, exit 0.
node verify.mjs tampered-decision.json --pubkey ab1c6c3dbc49c942d424f6b39ca6e658fe5d439e255e6efdd0427ef3fab4fbf5
# Expected: FAILED, exit 1.
node verify.mjs evidence-bundle.json --pubkey aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
# Expected: FAILED on expected key, exit 1.
node verify.mjs evidence-bundle.json --pubkey
# Expected: usage error, exit 2.
node verify.mjs evidence-bundle.json
# Expected: VERIFIED, explicitly integrity-only, exit 0.
```

The supplied test key is hosted with the example. It identifies this synthetic fixture, not an independently authenticated producer or author. In a real review obtain the expected issuer key independently. A passing check does not establish tool execution, complete capture, policy correctness, truthful inputs, freshness or a hardened enforcement boundary. Retain the original expected key and record hash outside the producer's mutable export.

The included verifier is byte-identical to the executable in @attested-intelligence/aga-verify 2.2.3, published and read back on September 30, 2026. Its public source commit is 48ca8f4245e0147aea4a2586d3003ea2274b0792. The archive SHA-256 is f7174a66426f236e483383798db27d87dbb582e5d6b49d6e65c6d46f6973e642. This manual package publication has no SLSA provenance attestation. Historical June sample and September boundary recording are unchanged.